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such precise repeats are bound to
emerge stochastically.
REFERENCES
Abeles, M. (1991). Corticonics: Neural Circuits
of the Cerebral Cortex (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Abeles, M., and Gat, I. (2001). J. Neurosci.
Methods 107, 141–154.
Csicsvari, J., Henze, D.A., Jamieson, B., Har-
ris, K.D., Sirota, A., Bartho´, P., Wise, K.D.,
and Buzsa´ki, G. (2003). J. Neurophysiol. 90,
1314–1323.
Gautrais, J., and Thorpe, S. (1998). Biosystems
48, 57–65.
Go¨bel, W., Kampa, B.M., and Helmchen, F.
(2007). Nat. Methods 4, 73–79.
Hebb, D.O. (1949). The Organization of Behav-
ior (New York: Wiley).
Ikegaya, Y., Aaron, G., Cossart, R., Aronov, D.,
Lampl, I., Ferster, D., and Yuste, R. (2004).
Science 304, 559–564.
Kelly, R.C., Smith, M.A., Samonds, J.M., Kohn,
A., Bonds, A.B., Movshon, J.A., and Lee, T.S.
(2007). J. Neurosci. 27, 261–264.
Lee, A.K., and Wilson, M.A. (2004). J. Neuro-
physiol. 92, 2555–2573.
Luczak, A., Bartho´, P., Marguet, S.L., Buzsa´ki,
G., and Harris, K.D. (2007). Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 104, 347–352.
Mokeichev, A., Okun, M., Barak, O., Katz, Y.,
Ben-Shahar, O., and Lampl, I. (2007). Neuron
53, this issue, 413–425.
Oram, M.W., Wiener, M.C., Lestienne, R., and
Richmond, B.J. (1999). J. Neurophysiol. 81,
3021–3033.
Neuron
PreviewsBehavioral Flexibility and the Frontal Lobe
Gregor Rainer1,*
1Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, D-72076 Tu¨bingen, Germany
*Correspondence: gregor.rainer@tuebingen.mpg.de
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2007.01.015
Brain areas in the frontal lobe have been implicated in behavioral flexibility and control. The study by
Johnston et al. in this issue of Neuron provides novel insights into the roles of the prefrontal and
anterior cingulate cortices in controlling behavior.Knowing which action is appropriate in
particular circumstances is an essen-
tial element of successful behavior.
For example, while punching (your op-
ponent) in the boxing ring may lead to
various rewards such as riches and
fame, performing the same action on
random passers-by in the street is
unlikely to do so. Depending on the
current task, an action can thus be
beneficial or detrimental to achieving
a defined behavioral goal such as re-
ward maximization. Maintaining task-
specific information and rapidly modi-
fying it in response to environmental
demands are considered to be hall-
marks of primate behavior. In the labo-
ratory, this kind of behavioral flexibility
can be studied by training subjects on
different tasks involving the same
actions and then having them perform
interleaved blocks of trials of each task
while recording brain activity. In this is-
sue of Neuron, Johnston et al. (2007)have employed a prosaccade and an
antisaccade task, during which mon-
keys had to either look toward or
away from a briefly flashed peripheral
target. Monkeys did not receive an ex-
plicit cue as to which task they were on
but figured this out themselves by no-
ticing which behaviors were rewarded
during each block of trials. After per-
formance of prosaccades for a number
of trials, reward contingencies were
switched at an unpredictable point in
time and previously successful behav-
iors were now unsuccessful and vice
versa. Behaviorally, monkeys were
quick to shift from one task to the
next and did so within a few trials.
How is this rapid switching accom-
plished, and how do monkeys manage
to remember which task they are on
over the course of each block? To
answer these questions, Johnston
et al. studied single-neuron activity
(SUA) in the prefrontal (PF) and theNeuron 53, Fanterior cingulate (AC) cortex as mon-
keys were switching back and forth
between these two tasks. They fo-
cused not on responses associated
with peripheral flashes or saccadic
eye movements during the task but
instead on differences in preparatory
or more commonly known as baseline
activity between the two tasks. In the
visual system, baseline activity
changes have been associated with
the maintenance of spatial attention
(Luck et al., 1997). Allocation of atten-
tion over the course of a block of trials
thus leads to an increase in baseline
firing rate of neurons representing
that region of space, and a visual stim-
ulus presented in the attended region
accordingly elicits overall more activity
than one presented in an unattended
region. By analogy, baseline changes
are thought to be involved in maintain-
ing and switching between task rules
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and Tanji, 1998). Both PF and AC cor-
tex have been implicated in behavioral
flexibility, and indeed Johnston et al.
found evidence for task-specific base-
line activity in both of these regions.
There were however two major striking
differences in the dynamics of baseline
changes between the two regions.
First, PF neurons showed similar base-
line changes throughout the entire
block of trials, whereas AC neurons
showed strong baseline changes only
immediately following the task switch.
Second, in the trial right after the task
switch, baseline changes were already
apparent in the AC but not in the PF
cortex. Both regions thus play a role
in task maintenance. PF neurons tend
to play a role during stable periods
where task rules remain constant and
continue to lead to behavioral suc-
cess, whereas AC neurons are closely
involved in switching from one task to
another and are more sensitive to be-
havioral errors than PF neurons.
The response characteristics of AC
neurons in the present study are in
several ways reminiscent of noradren-
ergic neurons originating in the locus
coeruleus (LC) (Aston-Jones and Co-
hen, 2005; Bouret and Sara, 2005).
LC neurons are known to respond to
novelty and to changes in reward con-
tingencies in rodents and monkeys, as
would be expected to occur at a task
switch in the present study. LC neural
responses also habituate rapidly, and
they would be expected to show atten-
uated responses during periods where
task rules remain constant. Finally,
noradrenergic neurons send and re-
ceive projections to virtually all cortical
regions, but interconnections with the
AC cortex are particularly prominent.
These close similarities raise the pos-
sibility that the AC responses ob-
served by Johnston et al. might indeed
be a result of noradrenergic neuromo-
dulation. Further experiments using
pharmacological manipulations are
needed to address this question, and
such studies could provide insight
into the functional mechanism under-
lying transient AC activation during
task switching.
Johnston et al. discuss their findings
in the context of human functional322 Neuron 53, February 1, 2007 ª2007magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
experiments that have aimed at eluci-
dating the functions of PF and AC cor-
tices. Based on these imaging studies
in humans, it is a widely accepted
notion that AC cortex is involved in
conflict monitoring, whereas by con-
trast SUA recording in monkeys in-
cluding the work of Johnston et al.
has not found evidence supporting
this notion. These findings can be rec-
onciled by abandoning the notion of
conflict monitoring and instead ascrib-
ing more general functions to the
AC cortex, such as for example task-
demand prediction or top-down control.
However, it is also important to keep in
mind that fMRI does not provide a di-
rect estimate of local SUA but instead
is a metabolic signal that reflects the
consumption of oxygen. Recent fMRI
work in monkeys has shown that
fMRI is more closely related to the lo-
cal field potential (LFP) than to single-
unit activity (SUA) (Logothetis et al.,
2001). The LFP is a mass signal that
reflects local dendritic processing
and is thus influenced by incoming sig-
nals from different brain regions as well
as local recurrent activity. By contrast,
SUA measures spiking activity and
thus provides an estimate of local re-
current activity and the outputs to the
target brain regions. In the context of
the functions of the AC this would pro-
vide a way to reconcile the apparently
conflicting data: conflict-monitoring-
related activity in the AC cortex mea-
sured using fMRI may be characteris-
tic of its input signals, whereas activity
related to the top-down control may
primarily reflect the output of the AC
cortex. In this view, the function of the
AC cortex would be to convert error
signals that reach it from upstream
brain regions to behavioral control sig-
nals which it broadcasts to PF cortex
and related brain regions. One pre-
diction that follows from these consid-
erations would be a dissociation
between SUA and LFP activity in the
AC cortex such that, unlike SUA, the
LFP should in fact contain signals re-
lated to conflict monitoring. Further ex-
periments will be necessary to evaluate
this possibility, but a recent study in
monkey inferior temporal cortex shows
that functional dissociations betweenElsevier Inc.LFP and SUA signals are indeed ob-
servable (Nielsen et al., 2006) and can
be used to provide insight into cortical
functions that are not available when
each of the signals is considered alone.
Importantly, it is the difference in re-
sponse profile between LFP and SUA
that most closely captures the function
of the brain region under study.
A current trend in systems neurosci-
ence is the recording of neural activity
at the SUA or LFP level in several brain
regions during the performance of the
same task. The work of Johnston
et al. is an excellent example of the
power of such joint recordings to reveal
how PF cortex collaborates with a re-
lated brain region to solve a particular
behavioral task. Examples of related
work have considered neural signals
related to working memory in the PF
and the parietal cortex (Chafee and
Goldman-Rakic, 1998) or compared
neural activity in the supplementary
eye fields and AC cortex during task-
conflict situations (Nakamura et al.,
2005). Differences in response dynam-
ics between PF cortex and the basal
ganglia during a reversal learning task
(Pasupathy and Miller, 2005) bear
many similarities to the work of John-
ston et al. For example both studies
have found that task-switching-related
changes in the basal ganglia and the
AC cortex occur before such changes
in the PF cortex. These findings are
somewhat at odds with the notion
that the PF cortex represents the cen-
tral executive of the brain, unless one
accepts a new management style in
which the central executive reaches
decisions by consulting appropriate
experts and then being taught how to
behave by those experts. Johnston
et al. go as far as speculating whether
PF and AC may in fact even use shared
management in the control of behavior.
In business or academia, central exec-
utives are often hesitant to share con-
trol. Future experiments will show us
which managementstyle the brainuses.
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